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Abstract—We construct a two species evolutionary game model
of an online society consisting of ordinary users and behavior
enforcers (moderators). Among themselves, moderators play a co-
ordination game choosing between being “positive” or ”negative”
(or harsh) while ordinary users play prisoner’s dilemma. When
interacting, moderators motivate good behavior (cooperation)
among the users through punitive actions while the moderators
themselves are encouraged or discouraged in their strategic
choice by these interactions. We show the following results: (i) We
show that the ω-limit set of the proposed system is sensitive both
to the degree of punishment and the proportion of moderators
in closed form. (ii) We demonstrate that the basin of attraction
for the Pareto optimal strategy (Cooperate,Positive) can be
computed exactly. (iii) We demonstrate that for certain initial
conditions the system is self-regulating. These results partially
explain the stability of many online users communities such as
Reddit. We illustrate our results with examples from this online
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) allow individuals to share
not only information about themselves, but also information
about their world. While traditional OSNs, such as Facebook,
Myspace, and Google+, are designed for sharing personal
information, new OSNs with a focus on sharing all interesting
information, personal or not, have become popular. These
OSNs, such as Reddit, Digg, and Funnyjunk, still allow users
to create online connections through shared interests and
experiences. Much like traditional OSNs, these new OSNs are
susceptible to user deception.
Reddit in particular rewards users for posting information
with a form of social capital called karma. Shared information,
in the form of posts, is upvoted or downvoted by the com-
munity. The user in turn accumulates karma based on how
popular his or her posts are. While karma has no intrinsic
value, it appears to be a desirable commodity within the Reddit
community. Karma is a unique and concrete measure of social
capital, a great tool to analyze online social behavior. One
interesting component of Reddit is the communal agreement
that honesty is highly preferred to dishonesty within the
system, should be rewarded, and moderators actively enforce
this policy through a variety of methods. In this paper, we
seek to develop dynamics that lead to the unique properties
found on Reddit: that is a self-stabilizing society in which
moderators (or authority figures) act in as kind a way as
possible with users committed to cooperation through honesty
at the potential expense of karma.
A. An Overview of Reddit
From the perspective of users, lying without malice does not
necessarily affect the holistic well-being of the Reddit social
network. Instead, users identify “trolls” as problematic. A troll
is a member of an online community whose contributions are
intended to enrage or offend as many people as possible, as
significantly as possible. In essence, trolls seek out opportuni-
ties to defend or propose indefensible, reprehensible positions
in order to receive a negative reaction from other community
members.
Many Reddit users will ignore trolls. However, in cases
where a troll is not ignored, online altercations may occur lead-
ing to communal breakdown within Reddit. Beyond the use
of karmic voting and individual interactions, Reddit enforces
community standards by utilizing two layers of moderators.
Specifically, subreddit1 specific moderators enforce Reddit and
subreddit guidelines by deleting posts and comments that were
not already buried by downvotes. These are the moderators
upon which the paper focuses. If these moderators are not
strict enough, subreddits sympathetic to trolling can harbor
and encourage trolling behavior, disrupting the community.
In this paper we model negative behavior within Reddit (or
a similar online community) as the defect behavior in a classic
prisoner’s dilemma. We justify this assumption by noting that
trolling is analogous to defecting, in the sense that defection
is characterized by an action that goes against what is best for
societal wellbeing for selfish reasons. In Section IV, where we
explictly define our user-user payoff matrix, we will detail our
justification for this assumption in further detail.
B. Paper Summary
In this paper, we develop a simple evolutionary game
that attempts to model the behavior of Reddit users and
moderators and illustrates how the Reddit equilibrium can be
reached; that is, an equilibrium in which most users agree
1A subreddit is a specific discussion forum within Reddit
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to cooperatively share information and in which moderators
beneficially interact with the system. We assume that ordinary
users interact with each other playing a prisoner’s dilemma
style game, while moderators interact with each other playing
a coordination game. The moderators’ strategy space consists
of the strategies, “Positive” and “Negative,” which attempts
to capture their view of users, in particular when they are
engaged in negative behavior. When a moderator and a user
interact, moderators may or may not derive benefit from the
interaction depending on the strategy of the user. A similar
statement holds for the user.
Specifically, given our evolutionary game system discussed
in the sequel, we show the following results: (i) We show that
the ω-limit set of the proposed system is sensitive both to
the degree of punishment and the proportion of moderators in
closed form. (ii) We demonstrate that the basin of attraction
for the Pareto optimal strategy (Cooperate,Positive) can be
computed exactly. (ii) We demonstrate that for certain initial
conditions the system is a regulating. These results partially
explain the stability of many online users communities such
as Reddit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we provide a brief literature review of deviance (or
negative behavior) in online social environments and a review
of the impact moderators have in this situation. In Section
III we layout our modeling approach and contrast it to the
one in [1]. In Section IV we present our basic model of the
system. In Section V we present our results on the dynamical
system under consideration. We present future directions and
conclusions in Section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Online deviance (defection, in our model) has been studied
from the perspective of both social science and computer sci-
ence. To date these two perspectives have not been adequately
integrated. Using classical labeling and identity theories, sev-
eral social researchers have focused on Internet users’ behavior
[2]–[6]. Labeling theory holds that being labeled as a “deviant”
leads a person to engage in deviant behavior, and explains
why people’s behavior clashes with social norms [2]. However,
social sciences research has not yet developed a normative def-
inition of cyber communication and the online subculture. A
significant study of online behavior that will inform our model
is the “Palace Study” in which Suler and Philips [4] classify
deviant behavior (strategies) into several types and provide a
taxonomy of possible counter-strategies, ranging from mild,
premeditative actions (e.g., warnings) to preventative systems.
The study confirms that existing prevention and remediation
of aversive online behavior techniques have been found to
be difficult and expensive. For instance, reputation systems
were found to be useful for this purpose, but are unreliable
due to the lack of identity validation and control [7]. Recent
socio-computational studies focus mostly on single short text
analysis to automatically identify spam/deviant comments in
user-contributed sites [8]–[12]. While content-based methods
have shown encouraging results, they are limited to single-
post analysis, and they do not target specific users’ behaviors
or follow traces.
Several tools exist to help moderators identify bots and
vandalism (e.g. [13], [14]). Automated bots (e.g., Cluebot),
filters (e.g., abusefilter), and editing assistants (e.g., Huggle
and Twinkle) all aim to locate acts of vandalism. Such tools
work via regular expressions and manually-authored rule sets.
In addition, a notable effort is from West and colleagues [15],
who adopted classifiers to detect vandalism on Wikipedia.
At the core of the West’s solution is a lightweight classifier
capable of identifying vandalism. The classifier exploits tem-
poral and spatial features, extracted from revision metadata of
articles.
Our work also parallels the body of work on free-riding in
peer-to-peer systems [16]. Peer-to-peer systems are designed
to allow users to connect with others and share resources.
Similar to online communities, users are free to access and
contribute as much as desired, and few controls are in place.
As for online communities, punishments, although applied, are
shown not to be truly effective, most likely because users
can abandon the system. To tackle these issues, the com-
mon solution is to implement incentive-based mechanisms.
Incentives are applied in certain online forums, whereby end
users are given special roles and privileges as a result of their
good-standing (see [17] for a discussion on the community
enforcement mechanisms of E-Bay). In this paper, we assume
that users cannot easily abandon the system (i.e., there are few
competitors and a barrier to change, as there is with Facebook)
and study the case when moderators focus on punishments
rather than incentives. (See Section IV.) We discuss how to
vary the model to study the incentives based case in Section
VI.
III. RELEVANT PREVIOUS WORK IN EVOLUTIONARY
GAMES
Consider a two-player bimatrix game. That is, the payoff
matrix for the row player is A ∈ Rn×n (n ∈ Z+) and
for the column player it is B. In an evolutionary game, let
ζ(t) ∈ Rn×1 be a vector whose ith component ζi(t) yields
the proportion of the population of row players that chooses
pure strategy i at time t. We will likewise define χ(t) ∈ Rn×1
for the column players. Hofbauer [1] proposes the following
replicator dynamics for this case:
ζ˙i = ζi
(
(Aχ)i − ζTAχ
)
i = 1, . . . , n (1)
χ˙i = χj
((
ζTB
)
j
− ζTBχ
)
j = 1, . . . , n (2)
This is a simple generalization of the replicator dynamics from
a zero-sum game to a general sum game.
For games in which a population is to play a symmetric
bimatrix game, we propose the following simplified dynamics.
Let ζ(t) ∈ Rn×n simply be the vector whose ith component is
the proportion of the population that is playing pure strategy
i at time t. Then for an individual playing strategy i, the
expected payoff value is nothing more than (Aζ)i, regardless
of whether this individual is a row or column player since
ζTAT = Aζ by symmetry. Care must be taken, however,
when computing the population average. In this case, the
population average is not ζTAζ as it is in the case of the
classical replicator dynamics [18]. Instead, the population
average is given by:
u¯ =
1
2
ζT
(
A+AT
)
ζ (3)
To see this, assume that (as expected) half the time a player
meets a competitor she will play the role of the row player
and the other half of the time she will play the roll of the
column player. Then the population average can be computed
as:
u¯ =
ζTAζ + ζTAT ζ
2
(4)
which is identical to Equation 3. This leads to a simplified
replicator dynamic in the case of a symmetric game:
ζ˙i = ζi
(
(Aζ)i −
1
2
ζT
(
A+AT
)
ζ
)
(5)
We will use this dynamic for the evolution of strategy within
our subpopulations of ordinary users and moderators while we
will use the formulation of Hofbauer in our inter-population
strategy evolution dynamics.
IV. MODEL
Let x(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ R+ be the proportion of ordinary
users who choose to cooperate (e.g., behave appropriately,
act honestly, etc.) while y(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ R+ is
the proportion of users who choose to defect (e.g., behave
negatively, deceive, etc.). Naturally our dynamics will require
x(t) + y(t) = 1 for all t ∈ R+. Likewise, let z(t) be
the proportion of moderators who choose to be positive and
let w(t) be the proportion of moderators who choose to be
negative so that z(t) + w(t) = 1 for all t ∈ R+ as well.
When interacting, each subpopulation plays a symmetric
general sum game: prisoner’s dilemma ( [19], Page 67) and a
coordination game respectively. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, users
who cooperate gain a benefit, but not so much as a user who
defects from a cooperating user. Two defecting users reap a
smaller benefit than they would if they cooperate.
For ordinary users, assume they have the following pris-
oner’s dilemma payoff matrix:
A =
[
r
2 −r
r r4
]
(6)
This assumption follows naturally from the following ober-
sations. Consider an interaction between two OSN users. If
both choose to cooperate, we would expect their interaction
to be beneficial to the community as a whole (e.g., produce
an insightful, genuine conversation). However, if one user
chooses to defect while the other opts to abide by community
standards, the defecting player will derive his satisfaction at
the expense of the unsuspecting, cooperating user (e.g., the
troll reaping the reward of anger from the legitimate user).
If both users defect, each will derive some satisfaction from
the experience (e.g., a shared joke between two like-minded
defectors), though not as much as if they had cooperated.
Thus, the dominant strategy is, as in the case of the textbook
prisoner’s dilemma problem, to defect, despite the social
optimum strategy being user cooperation.
In a coordination game, users who play the same strategy
are rewarded, while users who do not are penalized. The mod-
erators have the following coordination game payoff matrix:
F =
[
v −v
−v v
]
(7)
For simplicity in this paper, we will assume that r = v = 1
and leave results on the more general case to subsequent work.
When the two populations interact, they play a bimatrix with
payoff matrices given as:
B =
[
a
2 0−a2 −a
]
(8)
C =
[
s
2 0
s
4 s
]
(9)
Here B is the payoff matrix for ordinary users (as the row
players) and C is the payoff matrix for moderators (as the
column players). It is easy to see for a, s > 0 that ordinary
users benefit from meeting a positive moderator when they
are cooperating and gain nothing when they meet a negative
moderator. When an ordinary user is defecting he is penalized
when he meets any member of the moderator subpopulation,
but more so when he meets a negative moderator. Likewise,
moderators acting positively benefit when they meet any
player, but less so when they meet a defector (presumably
it makes them unhappy to consider a user engaged in negative
behavior, but they are able to moderate behavior, thus “improv-
ing society”). Moderators who are negative derive no pleasure
from meeting a cooperating user, but substantial pleasure from
punishing (or expelling) a defecting user. For the sake of
simplicity, we will assume that s = 1 for the remainder of
this paper. While these are specific payoff matrices, we assert
that the qualitative behavior we observe will be largely the
same no matter how we assign values, even in the presence of a
more complex game structure. Essentially, as long as the users
are playing prisoner’s dilemma, the moderators are playing a
coordination game, and there is a penalty when a defector
meets a moderator, then the qualitative behaviors we observe
will be present.
Assume that in a population of players a proportion np ∈
(0, 1) are ordinary users and nc ∈ (0, 1) are moderators where
np +nc = 1. Thus, np is the proportion of the population that
is an ordinary user. Let:
ξ(t) =
[
x(t)
y(t)
]
η(t) =
[
z(t)
w(t)
]
(10)
Combining the dynamics given in Equation 5 with Hofbauer’s
dynamics (Equations 1 and 2), we obtain the following dy-
namics for the player:
ξ˙i = ξi
(
np
(
(Aξ)i −
1
2
ξT
(
A+AT
)
ξ
)
+
nc
(
(Bη)i − ξTBη
))
i = 1, 2 (11)
η˙j = ηj
(
nc
(
(Fη)j −
1
2
ηT
(
F+ FT
)
η
)
+
np
((
ξTC
)
j
− ξTCη
))
j = 1, 2 (12)
In the sequel, we will explore the dynamics of stability
for varying values of np and a, the relative punitive value of
defecting when playing against a member of the moderators
subpopulation.
We first state a theorem that will simplify our analysis of
these dynamics. Essentially, it simply asserts we can solve
these differential equations completely on the subspace x(t)+
y(t) = 1 and z(t) + w(t) = 1.
Theorem IV.1. On the subspace defined by the equalities
x(t) + y(t) = 1 and z(t) + w(t) = 1, the dynamical system
given in Equations 11 and 12 is equivalent to the two-variable
differential system:
x˙ =
1
4
x (−1 + x) (−3np x+ 5np + 4np a− 4 a) (13)
z˙ = −1
4
z (−1 + z) (−16np z + 16 z + 5np − 8 + 5np x)
(14)
V. THEORETICAL RESULTS
The following theorem on the equilibria of the dynamical
system given by Equations 11 and 12 is easily verified by
substitution. We note there are nine equilibria that can be
identified by finding the roots of the right hand sides of
Equations 13 and 14.
Theorem V.1. For the dynamical system given by Equations
13 and 14, there are always 9 equilibria, (some possibly
spurious):
1) x = 0, z = 0
2) x = 0, z = 1
3) x = 1, z = 0
4) x = 1, z = 1
5) x = 0, z = 116
5np−8
−1+np
6) x = 13
5np+4np a−4 a
np
, z = 0
7) x = 1, z = 18
5np−4
−1+np
8) x = 13
5np+4np a−4 a
np
, z = 1
9) x = 13
5np+4np a−4 a
np
, z = 112
10np−6+5np a−5 a
−1+np
It is worthwhile noting that these equilibria may not always
be valid for our equations. It may be that the equilibrium points
fall outside the solution space x ∈ [0, 1] and z ∈ [0, 1]. In this
case, these stationary points are spurious. Of interest is the
ninth equilibrium point, because it is an interior equilibrium
point:
Corollary V.2. Assume np ∈ (0, 1), then there is a non-trivial,
non-spurious equilibrium point for which x, z ∈ (0, 1) (and
thus y, w ∈ (0, 1)) just in case:
1
2
np
1−np < a <
5
4
np
1−np if np <
8
11
1
2
np
1−np < a <
2
5
3−np
1−np if
8
11 ≤ np < 45
2
5
5np−3
1−np < a <
2
5
3−np
1−np
4
5 ≤ np
A more interesting question revolves around the stability of
the various equilibrium points. It would be nice to know that
the presence of the moderator subpopulation causes the coop-
erate strategy to become stable within the ordinary users, even
though in general prisoner’s dilemma it is not in any player’s
interest to cooperate. Moreover, we would also like a society in
which the moderators play the positive strategy, since there’s
no point in living in a society where users behave because
they are terrified of their system of justice. (Presumably, the
online society would fall apart.) We can explore this problem
by computing the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the
dynamical system. That is, by studying the characteristics of
the non-linear dynamical system described in Equations 11
and 12 by linearizing about a stable point of interest. In the
following lemma, we linearize about the utopian equilibrium
point x = 1, z = 1 and use the eigenvalues of the Jacobian to
determine when this point is stable.
Lemma V.3. The Jacobian matrix H of the dynamical system
described by Equations 13 and 14 about x = 1, z = 1 (and
y = 0 and w = 0) is specified by:
H =
[
1/2np − a+ np a 0
0 −2 + 3/2np
]
(15)
with eigenvalues: [ −2 + 3/2np
1/2np − a+ np a
]
From the previous lemma and Theorem 3.2 of [20] the
following theorem is immediate:
Theorem V.4. Assume np ∈ (0, 1). If:
np
2(1− np) < a
then x = 1, z = 1 (and y = 0 and w = 0) is a stable
equilibrium point.
The resulting relationship between the two variables is
illustrated in Figure 1. This figure makes a great deal of sense.
As the proportion of the population becomes overwhelmingly
dominated by ordinary users, the probability of encountering
a member of the moderators subpopulation drops. Therefore,
to ensure proper behavior, stricter and stricter punitive action
is required.
By a similar process, we can also explore the case of the
dystopian society in which [x = 0, y = 1, z = 0, w = 1] is
stable.
Fig. 1. The relationship between np and a when we ensure that [x = 1, y =
0, z = 1, w = 0] is a stable equilibrium point.
Theorem V.5. Assume np ∈ (0, 1). If:
5np
4(1− np) > a
then x = 0, z = 0 (and y = 1 and w = 1) is a stable
equilibrium point.
Corollary V.6. There is at least one pair of values for a and
np so that both [x = 0, y = 1, z = 0, w = 1] and [x = 1, y =
0, z = 1, w = 0] are stable.
Corollary V.6 tells us that in our online system, it is possible
to “descend into chaos” in the sense that all users are actively
defecting (deceiving, scamming etc.) and all moderators are
engaged in highly punitive activities. Corollary V.6 also sug-
gests that an investigation of the basins of attraction for the two
attracting points could lead to a complete characterization of
the behavior of the dynamical system in light of the following
theorem, which follows from Theorem 3.1 of [20]:
Theorem V.7. Under no conditions is the interior equilibrium
point
x = 13
5np+4np a−4 a
np
z = 112
10np−6+5np a−5 a
−1+np
ever stable.
Proof: Analysis of Jacobian matrix and eigenvalues shows
that for this point to be stable, we must have:
a <
1
2
np
1− np or
5
4
np
1− np < a and
a <
2
5
5np − 3
1− np or
2
5
3− np
1− np < a
From Theorem V.2, for the equilibrium to be non-spurious
(i.e., in [0, 1]× [0, 1]) it must be the case that:
a <
1
2
np
1− np and
2
5
3− np
1− np < a
If these intervals overlap, then there is a point at which:
np
2
=
2
5
(3− np)
which only occurs if np = 43 , but we know np ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
the interior equilibrium is always unstable.
What the preceding theorem means is that for many online
systems that obey the dynamics discussed will either converge
to a final state in which all users are behaving cooperatively
and moderators who are positive or it will descend into chaos.
This is illustrated in the figures below and proved explicitly
for certain np.
To illustrate the nature of the equilibria, we consider the case
when np = 0.9 and a = 7. (In this case, 90% of the population
is composed of ordinary users.) From Theorem V.1, we can see
that the non-trivial interior point equilibrium is present with
values: x = 1727 and z =
5
12 as are 6 other equilibrium points.
The system phase portrait is shown in Figure 2: In a case like
Fig. 2. Phase portrait of the dynamical system when a = 7 and np = 0.9
this, we can see that the space half-space x < 1727 , z ∈ (0, 1) is
the basin of attraction for the point for x = 0, z = 0 (except for
a set of measure zero) while the half-space x > 1727 , z ∈ (0, 1)
is the basin of attraction for x = 1, z = 1 (again except for a
set of measure zero).
The behavior of the population varies substantially with the
value of a and the previously illustrated behavior is not the
only possible outcome for this online society. An interesting
situation arises when we set np = 0.9 and a = 12. In this case,
there is no interior equilibrium point and the basin of attraction
for x = 1, z = 1 is almost the entire region [0, 1] × [0, 1].
This is shown in Figure 3. What’s interesting about this case
is the self-regulating nature of the system. Note the trajectory
beginning at x = 3100 and z =
99
100 . We see that the moderators,
while starting with the positive strategy, quickly change to
the negative strategy, which drives the ordinary users to move
from the defect strategy to the cooperate strategy. This, in
Fig. 3. Phase portrait of the dynamical system when a = 12 and np = 0.9
turn, drives the moderators to move from the negative strategy
to the positive strategy, arriving in the utopian scenario. We
now provide a result on the basin of attraction in scenarios
like the previous example. This result shows that the behavior
illustrated in Figure 2 is somewhat typical of this system
and describes how one online site can become successful and
(mostly) stable like Reddit, while other sites might descend
into chaos and fail.
Suppose that there is a non-trivial equilibrium solution for
which x∗ ∈ (0, 1), that is:
x∗ = 13
5np+4np a−4 a
np
(16)
Consider x∗ −  where  ∈ (0, x∗). If we evaluate
x˙ =
1
4
x (−1 + x) (−3np x+ 5np + 4np a− 4 a)
at x∗ − , then we obtain:
1
12
rs
np
(17)
where
r = (5np − 4 a+ 4np a− 3 np)
s = (4np a− 4 a+ 2np − 3 np)
Expression 17 is cubic in  and it has three roots:{
0,
2
3
2np a− 2 a+ np
np
,
1
3
5np − 4 a+ 4np a
np
}
We can see at once that:
1
3
5np − 4 a+ 4np a
np
− 2
3
2np a− 2 a+ np
np
= 1 (18)
and, by our assumption in Equation 16, the Expression 17 is
either always positive or always negative on the interval:[
0,
1
3
5np − 4 a+ 4np a
np
]
since the right endpoint of this interval is positive by as-
sumption. To determine the sign of the function, we can
can compute the critical points of the derivative of the cubic
equation as: (
7
9 np +
8
9 np a− 89 a± 1/9
√
v
)
np
(19)
where:
v = 19np
2 + 28 anp
2 − 28np a+ 16np2a2−
32np a
2 + 16 a2
The positive root is clear and the second derivative of the cubic
equation in  evaluated at this root is:
6np
√
v > 0 (20)
meaning that the positive root corresponds to a minimum and
thus, for all appropriately chosen values of np and a, we know
that x˙ < 0 when  > 0 and x must decrease toward 0. By a
similar argument, we can show that if  < 0, then x˙ > 0 and
x must increase toward 1. Thus we have proved:
Lemma V.8. Assume a non-spurious, non-trivial interior
equilibrium exists in the game; i.e., the ninth equilibrium point
from Theorem V.1 is contained in (0, 1)× (0, 1). If:
x(0) < 13
5np+4np a−4 a
np
(21)
then limt→∞ x(t) = 0. Otherwise, if x(0) is greater than this
value, limt→∞ x(t) = 1.
To complete the characterization of the limiting behavior
of the differential equation, we analyze the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix at x = 0, z = 1 and x = 1, z = 0. Our last
lemma follows from Theorem 3.1 of [20]:
Lemma V.9. The point x = 0, z = 1 is stable if and only if:
np <
8
11
and a <
5
4
np
1− np (22)
Furthermore, the point x = 1, z = 0 is stable if and only if:
np <
4
5
and
1
2
np
−1 + np < a (23)
From these lemmas and Corollary V.2, we have the follow-
ing theorem:
Theorem V.10. Suppose np > 45 and
2
5
5np − 3
1− np < a <
2
5
3− np
1− np
The basin of attraction for x = 1, z = 1 is the set of (x, z)
pairs so that:
1
3
5np+4np a−4 a
np
< x ≤ 1
0 < z < 1
and the basin of attraction for x = 0, z = 0 is:
0 ≤< x < 13 5np+4np a−4 anp
0 < z < 1
Theorem V.10 is illustrated in Figure 2. The more complex
behaviors this system is able to exhibit yield more complex
basins of attraction. However, since we anticipate np > 0.9,
we have focused on this case explicitly in Theorem V.10.
This tells us that under certain conditions the final state of
an (online) society (governed by these simple dynamics) can
depend substantially on the initial conditions of the system.
That is, if Reddit had been governed in this fashion, but the
initial user group was slightly less interested in the posting
of honest information (but the moderators were), then Reddit
could have easily descended into a more chaotic state.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We discuss three future directions for research: an incentives
based model, an optimal control model in which the penalty
is assigned dynamically and a model in which np is not fixed
and determined by epidemic dynamics.
A. Incentives Based Model
As noted, in the literature review, for online communities,
punishments, although applied, are shown not to be truly effec-
tive [21]. In this instance, incentives are applied to encourage
good behavior. We can modify the payoff matrix B as:
B =
[
a a2
0 −1
]
(24)
In this scenario, we can vary a to adjust the payoff received by
a user engaged in cooperative behavior. The following result
is immediate:
Theorem VI.1. When B is given by Equation 24 and the
remaining payoff matrices are held constant, the new set of
differential equations has four equilibria: x = 0, z = 0, x = 1,
z = 1, x = 1, z = 0 and x = 0, z = 1. Furthermore, x = 1,
z = 1 is stable just in case:
1
2
np
1− np < a (25)
and x = 0,z = 0 is stable just in case:
a <
1
2
9np − 4
1− np (26)
Example dynamics for the incentivizing game are shown in
Figure 4 Under these dynamics, the basin of attraction for the
utopian solution (x = 1, z = 1) is difficult to identify in closed
form, however you will observe he have dynamics similar to
those shown in Figure 3. Additional work on this problem
might yield interesting conditions on the incentive structures
for encouraging stable and beneficial social networks.
B. An Optimal Control Problem
In most Social Networking sites, the number of moderators
is static (that is, both np and nc are fixed). For the remainder
of this discussion, we will assume our original dynamics,
rather than the incentivizing behavior describe above. If we
can measure x(0) (and y(0)), we would like to identify
Fig. 4. Dynamics for the incentives game in which a = 15 and np = 0.9.
a time varying optimal value for a (the penalty) so that
x∗ = 1, z∗ = 1 is an attractor that is reachable from x(0).
However, an a that is too large may cripple the social network
(in a way not captured by the dynamics in this paper). We
can phrase this problem as a finite (or infinite) time horizon
optimal control problem:
min
∫ T
0
(1− x(t))2 + (1− z(t))2 + a(t)2dt
s.t. x˙ =
1
4
x (−1 + x) (−3np x+ 5np + 4np a− 4 a)
z˙ = −1
4
z (−1 + z) (−16np z + 16 z + 5np − 8 + 5np x)
x(0) = x0, z(0) = z0
a(t) ∈ [0,∞)
(27)
This problem will have a Hamiltonian [22] that is quadratic
in a and thus may admit a non bang-bang solution. Study of
this problem is reserved for future work.
C. Time Varying Population Proportions
As a second generalization of this problem, consider the
case where np is not static. We can model this scenario using
epidemic dynamics in which users become moderators in a
manner consistent with an infection:
n˙p = λ+ ρnc − βnpnc − µnp
n˙c = βnpnc − ρnc − µnc
If we assume a stable population, then λ = µ. Here β is the
infection rate, while ρ is a recovery rate that leads back to a
susceptible state. Using these differential equations with the
equations from (14 - 14) yields a more realistic dynamic. We
can also define a more complex optimal control problem in
which we attempt to find values for β and a that minimize
the objective functional of Expression 27.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we constructed a simple model of a self-
regulating system that describes (to some degree) the behavior
of a moderated online community. We showed that we need
only two differential equations to describe a complex two-
population evolutionary game, rather than the six that would be
used following the analytical techniques described in [1]. We
completely described the nature of the evolutionary dynamics
of the proposed system and illustrated how the level of
incentive (or penalty) associated with meeting a moderator
can effect the limiting behavior of the system. These results
are related to the online system Reddit. We also discuss future
work in which the population structure is varied and we posed
an optimal control problem that is relevant to the mechanism
design for social networks.
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